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PERSONNEL FOLLOWING THE TRANSFER OF POWER TO THE
IRAQI INTERIM GOVERNMENT
J. Stephen Shi*
The "fog of war" has not lifted from the extremely dynamic situation in Iraq
following the cessation of offensive operations by Coalition forces. The rapid
disintegration of the government of the former dictator, Saddam Hussein,
caused widespread disruption of critical services, such as those supplying
water, power, sanitation, medical, and security to the people of Iraq. In
addition, the continuing violence caused largely by former members of the
regime, political and religious insurgents, and foreign terrorists exacerbated the
extremely serious and volatile situation.
Into this maelstrom came the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the
initial civilian governing body for post-war Iraq. The CPA was charged with
the monumental challenge of addressing the plight of the Iraqi people both in
terms of providing for their immediate physical needs and reestablishing
security and stability.' The overall goal of the CPA was to create conditions
that would facilitate the creation of a new government by the Iraqis whereby
they could assume responsibility for their own country.2 Not only was the
CPA confronted with a situation that in many ways rivaled that faced by the
Allies after World War II, it was also given an incredibly short timeframe
within which to accomplish its mission: the CPA was established in May 2003'
and was to transfer its authority and principal functions to an Iraqi government
on June 30, 2004.4
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2 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Remarks to the Press with Coalition Provisional
Authority Administrator L. Paul Brewer (Mar. 19, 2004), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/
30621 .htm.
' Letter dated 8 May 2003from the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/6538 (2003) (communi-
cating to the President of the Security Council that the United States and its Coalition partners
had created the CPA).
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The role of the CPA was controversial from its inception. The CPA was
established amidst the turmoil of a forcible change of government by an
international coalition and the legality and necessity of its establishment is still
being hotly debated by politicians, academics, and other observers.5 Its efforts
were further exacerbated by the profound and widespread effects of decades
of repression of the Iraqi people, the neglect of the Iraqi infrastructure and
economy by the regime of Saddam Hussein, and continuing internecine,
sectarian, and terroristic violence.
The CPA had to deal with these legal, social, economic, and security
challenges and problems in a virtual "fish bowl" atmosphere where its every
action was subjected to intense scrutiny in the world press. Although the
significant accomplishments of the CPA are still being cataloged, the fact that
it made any progress at all is a testament to the dedication and professionalism
of those involved with the CPA and other entities that worked so hard during
the transition from dictatorial rule to a new government based on democratic
principles.
Not surprisingly, the pace of the CPA's work continued to accelerate,
especially during June 2004 with much of the attention being directed to the
critical need to effectively bridge the transfer of power to the Iraqi Interim
Government (Interim Government).6 In the midst of this super-heated
environment, with daily attacks and other security threats aimed at disrupting
the handover to the Interim Government, the CPA Administrator, L. Paul
Bremer III, promulgated a number of orders ostensibly to allow as seamless a
transfer as possible of the many functions and powers needed for the
governance of Iraq.7 These orders covered a wide range of subjects in varying
levels of detail, ranging from such minutiae as mandating that a vehicle driver
always keep both hands on the steering wheel to very broad policies regarding
far-reaching economic, political, and security matters.9
Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA/ORD/28 June 2004/100 (2004).
' Compare John Yoo, Future Implication of the Iraq Conflict. International Law and the
War in Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 563 (2003), with Winston P. Naga & Craig Hammer, The New
Bush National Security Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 375 (2004).
6 Press Release, Coalition Provisional Authority, Administrator's Weekly Report:
Governance, at 1 (June 19-28,2004), http://www.iraqcoalition.org/government/weekly-updates
Jcongo/June28_Gov.doc.
7 See generally CPA Official Documents, http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/index.
html#Regulations (last visited Oct. 28, 2004).
8 Traffic Code, Ord. No. 86, Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA/ORD/1 9 May 2004/86
(2004).
' See, e.g., Freedom of Assembly, Ord. No. 19, Coalition Provisional Authority,
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At least one of these orders, Order Number 17 (Order 17),'o has caused no
small amount of comment and concern from a variety of observers since it
addresses the important issues relating to the continuing presence of foreign
military and civilian personnel in Iraq following the transfer of power to the
Interim Government. In particular, the immunity previously established for
personnel of the CPA was extended through the tenure of the Interim
Government."
This Comment will briefly summarize the principal substantive provisions
of Order 17 and will discuss some of its possible legal and practical ramifica-
tions. It will conclude with an overall appraisal of the Order in terms of its
likely ability to achieve the apparent goals of the CPA in promulgating it.
I. SUMMARY OF THE ORDER
Order 17 addresses the legal status of the myriad foreign military and
civilian personnel in Iraq performing numerous tasks in support of the
fledgling Iraqi Interim Government. It is prospective in nature in that it was
promulgated literally on the eve of the handover of political power from the
CPA to the Interim Government and by its terms extends in duration to the
termination of the "mandate authorizing the MNF [Multinational Force] under
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1511 and 1546 and any subsequent relevant
resolutions and ... until the departure of the final element of the MNF from
Iraq, unless rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having force
of law."' 2
Order 17 is comprised of a preamble, twenty substantive sections, and an
annex concerning certain primarily technical aspects of the allocation of the
radio frequency spectrum. 3 For purposes of this Comment, the focus is on
those provisions that have the greatest impact on the control, oversight, and
accountability for the many foreign military and civilian personnel in Iraq."a
CPA/ORD/09 July 2003/19 (2003).
l0 Status of the Coalition ProvisionalAuthority, ANF-lIraq, Certain Missions andPersonnel
in Iraq, Ord. No. 17, Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA/ORD/17 June 2004/17 (2004)
[hereinafter Order 17].
E.g., id. § 2(3).
12 Id. § 20.
I3 d. Annex art. III.
These provisions include Section 1 (Definitions), Section 2 (Iraqi Legal Process), Section
3 (Diplomatic and Consular Missions), Section 4 (Contractors), Section 5 (Waiver of Legal
Immunity and Jurisdiction), Section 7 (Travel and Transport), Section 11 (Recruitment of Local
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These personnel serve in various capacities that are either directly or indirectly
supporting the Interim Government during the transition period, or possibly the
successor government established in conjunction with the adoption of a new
Iraqi Constitution and government.
Section 1 of Order 17 sets out certain definitions of key terms used in the
remainder of the Order. 5 A number of these definitions also provide
additional insight into the apparent intentions of the CPA when promulgating
the Order. Taken together, the definitions identify those persons and entities
that are covered by and benefit from Order 17, including: non-Iraqi military
forces and civilian personnel assigned to or under the control or command of
the Commander of the MNF; the CPA administrator; foreign liaison missions
(until July 1,2004); and diplomatic and consular missions. 6 Also included are
non-Iraqi entities or individuals that are private contractors and subcontractors
supplying goods or services in Iraq under a "contract."' 7
Section 2 establishes immunity from all legal process for these entities and
individuals, as well as for their property, funds, and assets.'8 All personnel
covered by the Order are also directed to "respect the Iraqi laws relevant to
[them] including the Regulations, Orders, Memoranda and Public Notices
issued by the Administrator of the CPA."19
Importantly, all covered personnel are made subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of their respective Sending States.2' They are immune from any
Personnel), Section 14 (Uniforms and Arms), Section 15 (Identification), and Section 18
(Claims). See id. The remaining provisions of Order 17 are not examined in this Comment.
15 Id. § 1.
16 Id. § 1.
7 "Contract" is defined as
a) a contract or grant agreement with the CPA or any successor agreement
thereto, or a contract or grant agreement with a Sending State, to supply
goods and services in Iraq, where that supply is: i) to or on behalf of the
MNF; ii) for humanitarian aid, reconstruction or development projects
approved and organized by the CPA or a Sending State; iii) for the construc-
tion, reconstruction or operation of Diplomatic and Consular Missions; or iv)
until July 1, 2004, to or on behalf of Foreign Liaison Missions; or b) a
contract for security services provided by Private Security Companies to
Foreign Liaison Missions and their Personnel, Diplomatic and Consular
Missions and their personnel, the MNF and its Personnel, International
Consultants, or Contractors.
Id. § 1(13).
18 Id. § 2(1).
19 Id. § 2(2).
20 Id. § 2(3).
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form of restraint on their liberty other than when it is imposed on behalf of
their respective Sending States. MNF personnel may, however, act to prevent
serious misconduct by covered personnel or detain them if they pose a risk of
injury to themselves or others.22 In such cases, representatives of the Sending
State of the persons involved must be immediately notified and where such
persons are detained, they must be expeditiously transferred to appropriate
authorities of the affected Sending State.23
Sending States of MNF personnel also are given the right to exercise
criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction in Iraq over those persons subject to the
military law of such Sending State.24 The immunities afforded under Section
2 extend to the personnel, property, funds, and assets of Foreign Liaison
Missions only with respect to acts or omissions committed during the period
of authority of the CPA, ending on June 30, 2004.25
Section 3 makes all premises of Diplomatic and Consular Missions subject
to the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961
and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963.26 It further
recognizes that Iraq may enter into additional bilateral agreements with any
other state regarding existing or new premises for use by diplomatic and
consular missions.27
Section 4 addresses the issues raised by the presence and activities of non-
Iraqi private contractors.28 It first provides that any Sending State may contract
independently with any supplier or contractor for any goods or services needed
in Iraq by the Sending State.29 For those contracts covered by the Order, the
parties thereto are immune from the application of Iraqi laws and regulations
relating to the terms and conditions of such contracts." For other activities in
Iraq not covered by the Order, contractors are required to comply with Iraqi
laws regarding applicable licensing and registration requirements.3 Private




24 Id. § 2(4).
2'5 Id. § 2(5).
26 Id. § 3.
27 Id.
28 Id. § 4.
29 Id. § 4(1).
30 Id. § 4(2).
31 id.
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applicable CPA orders and other requirements while conducting their activities
in Iraq. 32 These regulations include registration and licensing of weapons and
firearms.33
Contractors are also granted immunity from Iraqi legal process, but only in
connection with their activities relating to any contract or sub-contract as
defined in the Order. 34 As in the case of immunity for other covered persons,
there are also limited exceptions for MNF personnel to act to prevent serious
misconduct by such contractors or to otherwise temporarily detain them should
they pose a risk of injury to themselves or others.35 These actions are subject
to notification and expeditious turnover to representatives of the affected
Sending State.36
Contractors are obligated to respect all relevant Iraqi laws, including orders
and directives of the CPA.37 Certification by a Sending State that its contractor
acted pursuant to the terms of its contract shall be conclusive evidence thereof
in any Iraqi legal process.38 In the case of contractors, the Sending State is
deemed to be the state of nationality of any such contractor notwithstanding
the somewhat broader definition of Sending State in Section 1 (5).39
Section 5 provides that the immunities granted in Order 17 are not for the
personal benefit of covered individuals and may be waived.4 Requests for
waivers for all covered personnel except for contractors must be directed to the
respective Sending State.4 In the case of Contractors, such requests shall be
made to the relevant Sending State in relation to the activities of the contractor
under the contract involved.42
Section 7 covers freedom of movement of covered personnel and other
transportation-related matters.43 Vehicles, vessels, and aircraft of covered
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. § 4(3).
33 Id.
36 Id.
3 Id. § 4(4).
3 Id. § 4(5).
39 Id. § 4(6). Section 1(5) defines "sending state" as a "State providing personnel,
International Consultants, services, equipment, provisions, supplies, material, other goods or
construction work" to the CPA, MNF, international efforts, diplomatic or consular missions, or
foreign liaison missions. Id. § 1(5).
40 Id. § 5(1).
41 Id. § 5(3).
42 Id. § 5(3).
43 Id. § 7.
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entities and personnel are exempted from registration, licensing, and inspection
by the Iraqi government, with the additional requirement that the equipment
of Contractors carry appropriate third-party insurance." In addition, there is
an exemption from the payment of any dues, tolls, landing fees and the like,
although where services are requested and rendered, no exemption can be
claimed for charges at rates most favorable to the CPA and those covered by
the Order. 5
The MNF Commander, while obligated to cooperate with the Iraqi
government regarding control and usage of Iraqi airspace for all military and
civilian aircraft, is empowered to control Iraqi airspace required for military
operations." The MNF Commander is also charged with implementing a
transfer of air traffic management to Iraqi civilian control.47 This transfer is
to maintain safety and efficiency of air traffic management and security. It
will also be commensurate with the capabilities of the Interim Government and
will conclude no later than the date of departure of the MNF from Iraq. 4
Section 1I permits the MNF, Sending States, and contractors to employ
persons locally in Iraq as may be required. 9 The terms and conditions of such
employment will be determined by the MNF, Sending States, and the terms of
the Contractor's contract.5
Section 14 governs the important issues of uniforms and arms.5' As a
general rule, military members of the MNF shall wear the appropriate official
uniform of their respective Sending State when performing their duties. 2 The
MNF Commander may also authorize the wearing of other clothing for
operational reasons as well as the wearing of civilian clothes at other times."
MNF and PSC personnel may possess/carry arms when required by their
official duties or the terms and conditions of their contracts, respectively. 4
Finally, "[a]s authorized by the ambassador or chargd d'affaires of a Sending
- Id. § 7(2).
41 Id. § 7(3).
4 Id. § 7(4).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. § 11.
so Id.
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State, Diplomatic and Consular personnel may possess and carry arms while
on official duty."55
Section 15 requires, upon the request of the Iraqi government, a Sending
State to confirm whether a given person is within a category of persons
covered by the Order. 6
Section 18 specifies that, unless
immunity has been waived pursuant to Section 5 of this Order,
third-party claims . . . arising from or attributed to acts or
omissions of CPA, MNF Foreign Liaison Mission Personnel,
International Consultants, and Contractors or any persons
employed by them [to perform a covered contract], whether
normally resident in Iraq or not and that do not arise in connec-
tion with military operations, shall be submitted [to] the Sending
State whose personnel (including the Contractors engaged by that
State), property, activities or other assets are alleged to have
caused the claimed damage...57
Such claims shall be resolved in a manner consistent with the laws, regula-
tions, and procedures of the affected Sending State. 8
Section 19 allows the MNF Commander to negotiate and conclude
supplemental agreements of Protocols to the Order with the Iraqi Government,
and calls upon the MNF and Iraqi Government to ensure close and reciprocal
liaison at every appropriate level.59
Section 20 establishes the effective period of the Order from the date of
signature by the CPA Administrator until the departure of the final element of
the MNF from Iraq due to the termination of the mandate for the MNF by the
UN, unless rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the
force of law.60
55 Id.
56 Id. § 15.
" Id. § 18.
58 Id.




II. INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS OF SELECTED
PROVISIONS OF ORDER 17
The basis for and extent of jurisdiction of the CPA to issue orders such as
Order 17 were announced in the first regulation to be issued by the CPA.6
Among other things, Regulation 1 provided that the CPA would temporarily
exercise necessary governmental powers "for the effective administration of
Iraq during the period of transitional administration."62
Regulation 1 also provided that the goals of the CPA include restoring
stability and security, creating conditions that will enable the people of Iraq to
determine their political future in an atmosphere free from coercion, and
promoting economic recovery and reconstruction.6 3 To that end, the CPA was
vested with exclusive executive, legislative, and judicial jurisdiction over
Iraq.
64
Within a week of the Regulation's issuance, the UN Security Council
expressly endorsed this approach by encouraging the CPA to administer
matters in Iraq so as to ensure the welfare of the Iraqi people.65 The Security
Council also emphasized the need to establish an interim administrative
structure run by Iraqis.66 Less than two months later the CPA established the
Governing Council of Iraqis as "the principal body of the Iraqi interim
administration. '67 The Security Council subsequently endorsed this action,
stating that it welcomed "the establishment of the broadly representative
Governing Council ofIaq... as an important step towards ... representative
government.... 68
These and numerous other similar actions and responses are strong
evidence that the CPA was legitimately empowered to exercise the governmen-
tal functions on behalf of the people of Iraq until such time as security,
economic, infrastructure, and other conditions in the country allowed Iraqis to
form their own government. Thus, it is understandable that, on occasion, some
61 The Coalition Provisional Authority, Reg. No. 1, Coalition Provisional Authority,
CPA/REG/16 May 2003/01 (2003).
62 Id. § 1.
63 Id.
64 Id. § 1(2).
65 S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4761 st mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003).
6 Id. at 3.
67 Governing Council ofIraq, Reg. No. 6, Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA/REG/13
July 2003/06 (2003).
68 S.C. Res. 1500, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4808th mtg., U.N. Doc S/Res/I 500 (2003).
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of the actions of the CPA could be said to carry with them what some would
characterize as a paternalistic tone since the CPA was in effect acting in loco
parentis for the Iraqi people.
Accordingly, while perhaps not yet conclusively or unanimously deter-
mined by some observers, the CPA appears to have had the requisite authority
to issue Order 17, albeit in the waning hours of its official existence. At least
from a practical standpoint, the matters addressed by the CPA in Order 17
would appear to be reasonable, appropriate, and not particularly surprising in
the context of the ongoing security challenges and the continuing activities of
foreign governmental and private contractor entities and personnel providing
support for both establishing the Interim Government and assisting in the
reconstruction of critical infrastructure. Indeed, many of the provisions of
Order 17 were fundamentally necessary if support was to continue beyond the
disestablishment of the CPA, since without the protections and accommoda-
tions provided by Order 17, some States and private contractors would likely
not have participated.
Beyond the underlying legitimacy of Order 17, there are a number of terms,
provisions, and apparent omissions that warrant further discussion in the
context of their potential for misinterpretation or for being otherwise
problematic in their application. Further, since the drafting history is to date
unknown, it is impossible to determine whether these terms, provisions, and
omissions were actually intended by the CPA or were merely errors in drafting.
A number of definitions contained in Section 1 raise questions. For
instance, the definitions of "Contract" and "Private Security Companies" do
not appear to include those PSCs that may have been employed by the CPA.69
When read in the context of the immunities generally provided to contractors
in Section 4, this could expose such PSCs and their personnel to potential
liability for acts or omissions while working for the CPA, notwithstanding its
subsequent disestablishment. Such an interpretation could also be bolstered
by the contrasting treatment afforded to Foreign Liaison Mission personnel for
acts or omissions during the tenure of the CPA in Section 2(5).70
Further, the immunities and other provisions in Section 2, along with those
elsewhere in Order 17 regarding MNF, CPA, and Foreign Liaison Mission
Personnel and International Consultants, inexplicably omit Diplomatic and
Consular personnel.7' Although it may be argued that this is an implicit
69 Order 17, supra note 10, § 1.




recognition that such personnel should have the immunity afforded diplomatic
personnel generally, such provision should have been included in Section 3.
Section 3, however, while addressing utilization of the premises of such
Missions, is remarkably silent as to the status of their personnel, whether on
such premises or elsewhere in Iraq. Indeed, Order 17 is silent as to the legal
status of these personnel in terms of their immunity from Iraqi legal process.
Section 4, which deals with contractors, has the greatest potential for both
legal and practical problems in its implementation and enforcement.72 In terms
of the Section's provisions, a number are ambiguous or otherwise difficult to
interpret, while others may prove impractical or unenforceable. This is
especially unfortunate given the extensive and increasing reliance on such
private contractors to provide much of the support needed by the Iraqi
government,73 whether directly or indirectly through contracts with the MNF
or other organizations.
For instance, Section 4(1) allows Sending States to employ any contractor
or supplier "without restriction. '74  This raises the question of whether
suppliers and contractors from states that are otherwise restricted or prohibited
from participating in such activities due to trade and other sanctions or
embargoes imposed by the UN may nevertheless solicit contracts under Order
17. In addition, this section provides that each contract may be "awarded in
accordance with the Sending State's laws and regulations."" When considered
in the context of the overall contracting process typically involved in such
situations, the inexplicable limitation to one of the initial steps in this
process-the award of the contract-appears to leave open the more important
questions: What laws govern the performance of such contracts? What
remedies are available in case of breach? Which fora have jurisdiction to
resolve such issues?
Contractors are also afforded immunity from Iraqi legal process,76 but in
contrast to the virtually absolute immunity granted to CPA and MNF personnel
and international consultants in Section 2," it is limited to those "matters
72 See Joanne Mariner, Private Contractors Who Torture, FIND LAW, May 10, 2004, at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/mariner/20040510.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2005).
" See, e.g., Mary H. Cooper, A New Reliance on America's Other Army, 62 CONG. Q.
WKLY. 2185, 2186-90 (2004).
14 Id. § 4(1).
"s Id. (emphasis added).
76 Id. § 4(3).
" See id. § 2.
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relating to the terms and conditions of their Contracts. 7 ' Significantly, the
certification of the Sending State that its contractor acted in a given situation
pursuant to such terms and conditions is deemed conclusive evidence thereof.
7 9
This could effectively deprive the Iraqi legal system of any jurisdiction over
such contractor in connection with matters covered by the immunity.
Whether there are some limits to this certification is a question of vital
importance. For example, while some criminal acts of a contractor such as
fraud or other financial crimes could arguably be said to be "relat[ed] to the
terms and conditions of their Contracts,"" others like assault, rape; and murder
could be well beyond the scope of the contract. In the case of PSCs, however,
even this distinction may break down; a homicide or assault could be argued
to be related to their contracts to provide security. What could the Interim
Government do if the Sending State nevertheless certifies otherwise,
particularly if either the laws of the Sending State do not effectively provide
for prosecution of the contractor or the political situation is such that the
Sending State will not likely pursue the matter to the extent warranted by the
crime itself?
There is also a somewhat curious provision that, notwithstanding the
definition of "Sending State" in Section 1(5),"' for a "contract or grant
agreement with or on behalf of the CPA and.., any successor agreement or
agreements thereto, the Sending State shall be the state of nationality of the
individual or entity concerned."82 Presumably, the reference to "individual or
entity" is synonymous with "Contractor," but that is not clear from the actual
language.
There is another inconsistency in the nature of the obligations of contrac-
tors generally, as compared to PSCs specifically, with respect to Iraqi laws,
CPA orders, and other directives. PSCs "must comply" with such laws, orders
and directives 3 whereas contractors in general are merely required to "respect"
them." It is unclear from the text whether this distinction is important.
Of perhaps even more significance than these textual concerns is that
Section 4 also implicates the broader issue of whether existing norms of
international law and the legal systems of individual states are adequate to
11 Id. § 4(2).
79 Id. § 4(5).
80 Id. § 4(2).
81 Id. § 1(5).
2 Id. § 4(6) (emphasis added).
83 Id. § 4(2).
84 Id. § 4(4).
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address the profound and dramatic expansion in the last decade of the use of
private contractors, in both numbers and in the scope of tasks they perform in
such challenging situations like those in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the former
Yugoslavia." This is a relatively new phenomenon whereby private entities
and individuals, instead of or to augment the more traditional role of individual
or collective governmental and quasi-governmental entities, are used to
perform the myriad tasks involved in the building or reconstruction of a state's
ability to govern itself and adequately provide for the welfare of its own
people.
These functions, while initially limited primarily to support roles, have
spread across the full spectrum of government activities, and now include
security matters ranging from intelligence collection and analysis to conduct-
ing actual combat operations.8 6 Obviously, the latter type of activities have
usually been undertaken by military and police forces provided by nations,
individually or collectively, that are assumed to be trained, equipped, and
deployed in a competent and disciplined manner. As such, these forces are
also assumed to act in conformity with the requirements of international law,
particularly the so-called law of armed conflict."s Accordingly, they are
presumed to be legally accountable for the manner in which their operations
are conducted, so that if there are alleged breaches of discipline or outright
violations of national or international law they will be effectively addressed,
with the guilty being punished appropriately and the victims being duly
compensated where possible. 8
When, however, private contractors perform similar functions, their status
under both the domestic law of relevant states and international
law-particularly the extent to which they are subject to, and their conduct is
ordered by, adequate legal controls-is by no means clear.89 Indeed, some
recent situations involving private contractors employed by state governments
indicate that there are very troubling legal and practical problems that have
allowed private contractors to escape punishment for very serious criminal
" See generally Peter Warren Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized
Military Firms andInternational Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 521 (2004).
6 See Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and
Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879, 886 (2004).
"' Cherif Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of International Humanitarian Law:
Overlaps, Gaps and Ambiguities, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 2002 (1998).
" See generally William G. Eckhardt, Nuremberg-Fifty Years: Accountability and
Responsibility, 65 UMKC L. REV. 1 (1996).
" Singer, supra note 85.
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acts.9" Not only are there potential legal gaps in terms of a Sending State's
jurisdiction to prosecute and punish one of its contractors for criminal acts
committed in Iraq, but there will also likely be significant practical impedi-
ments with such a prosecution in terms of availability of witnesses and
evidence, especially when such proceedings are conducted outside of Iraq.
Section 5 provides that the immunities granted in Sections 2 and 4
regarding MNF, CPA, Foreign Mission Personnel, International Consultants,
and Contractors may be waived by the respective Sending State.9' There are,
however, several issues raised by its provisions, including whether the waiver
is available in the case of entities that are within the definition of Contractors
under Order 17, since Section 5(1) indicates that the immunities of the Order
are "not for the benefit of the individuals concerned and may be waived
pursuant to this Section." 92 In addition, although Section 5(3) indicates that,
in the case of Contractors, requests for waiver of immunity are to be referred
to the "relevant Sending State,"9 3 it is not clear if this also means the state of
nationality in the context of Section 4(6), which concerns contracts with or on
behalf of the CPA.94
Section 7 provisions regarding travel and transport also raise questions as
to interpretation and enforcement. The broad right of freedom of movement
granted to personnel of the MNF, CPA and Foreign Liaison Missions,
International Consultants, and Contractors (to the extent necessary to perform
their Contracts)95 does not take into account the possible exigencies relating
to security matters that could require the Interim Government to attempt to
restrict or control movement and access. These situations are inherently
dangerous and the failure to address how this potential conflict is to be handled
could have tragic consequences. Interestingly, this potential for conflict
between the movement of personnel covered by Order 17 and efforts to control
such movements by the Interim Government was apparently recognized by the
drafters of Order 17, at least in the context of air traffic management, in that
Section 7(4) provides for coordination and eventual turn-over of control to the
Iraqi government."
90 id. at 524-25.
9' Order 17, supra note 10, § 5.
92 Id. § 5(1) (emphasis added).
93 Id. § 5(3).
- Id. § 4(6).
95 Id. § 7(1).
96 Id. § 7(4).
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Section 11 reveals potential issues regarding the way personnel, presumably
Iraqi citizens and non-Iraqis not otherwise subject to the Order, may be locally
recruited, hired, and employed by persons or entities covered by Order 17.
This section provides that the terms and conditions of such recruitment, hiring,
and employment are to be determined respectively by the MNF, Sending States
and, in the case of Contractors, by the terms of the particular contract.97 This
approach could, nevertheless, conflict with Iraqi laws concerning such
important matters as workplace safety, child labor, hours, and wages.98 Given
the significance of many of these laws, the general requirement in Sections
2(2) and 4(4) that parties covered by the Order "respect" Iraqi laws" seems
inadequate without a mechanism for reconciling potential conflicting
requirements.
Section 14 governs the wearing of uniforms and the carrying of arms by
MNF and certain other personnel.' Although it does provide uniform
requirements for MINF military personnel, it is silent as to any requirements for
uniforms or other distinctive clothing for MNF civilian personnel or PSC
personnel. This section also authorizes the carrying of "arms" by personnel of
the MNF (presumably both military and civilian) and PSCs, as well as
Consular and Diplomatic Personnel under certain conditions.1"' A particularly
significant omission, however, is that Order 17 does not clarify what type of
weapons are within the meaning of the term "arms," which in the context of
the proliferation of small arms and heavier weapons and explosives throughout
Iraq could prove troubling at best.
Another potential ambiguity exists in Section 15 regarding identification
of persons covered by the Order. Specifically, upon the request of the Iraqi
government, a Sending State is obligated to "confirm that an individual falls
into one of the categories covered by this Order."'0 2 There is no mention made
of confirming whether an entity may also be within the coverage of Order 17,
although the definition of "Contractor" in Section 1(11) recognizes such
coverage.13 Further, in contrast to the provision of Section 4(5) that makes
conclusive the certification of a Sending State (that one of its contractors is
97 Id. § 11.
"' Cf Amendments to the Labor Code Law No. 71 of 1987, Ord. No. 89, Coalition
Provisional Authority, CPA/ORD/05 May 2004/89 (2004).
99 Id. §§ 2,4.
' Id § 14.
101 Id.
102 Id. § 15.
03 Id. § 1(11).
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effectively covered by the immunity from Iraqi legal process provided
therein),"°4 it is unclear what the legal effect of this "certification" will be
where the Interim Government seeks to enforce its laws against the individual
whose status is so certified.
Finally, Section 18 concerns the handling of third party claims for property
loss, damage, or personal injury arising out of the activities of persons or
entities covered by Order 17.105 Similar to several other sections noted
previously,0 6 there is the specific omission of Diplomatic and Consular
personnel from the litany of those categories of personnel who benefit from the
Order. The manner of submitting such claims is also confused in that there
appears to have been an unintentional omission of the word "by" in the phrase
"[claims] shall be submitted and dealt with by the Sending State whose
personnel ... are alleged to have caused the claimed damage."107
III. CONCLUSION
Order 17 is one of several potentially critical components of the overall
effort by the CPA to transfer power to the fledgling Iraqi Interim Government
in an orderly and effective manner. While, as noted previously, there are a
number of internal inconsistencies, apparently unintended omissions and
provisions that are potentially difficult if not impossible to enforce, the overall
thrust of Order 17 regarding important issues like immunity of personnel
assisting the Iraqi government, responsibilities of Sending States, and the like
is appropriate and reasonable under the circumstances existing at the time of
the CPA's dissolution. Hopefully, should there be difficulties in the applica-
tion of the Order as the Iraqi people continue their efforts to establish their
own institutional capabilities to govern themselves, those inconsistencies can
be resolved without undue difficulty.
104 Id § 4(5).
105 Id. § 18.
106 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
107 Order 17, supra note 10, § 18.
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